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ABSTRACT 
 
Information transparency is a popular topic in capital markets. A firm’s corporate governance 
policy, which influences its disclosure behavior and disclosure quality, influences the information 
transparency perceived in relation to that firm. It was previously understood that greater 
information asymmetry between investors and issuers/underwriters translates into a larger 
discount required to be offered in bond pricing by the issuing firm, to attract investors. In this 
paper, we numerically analyze: (a) the effect of the composition of the board structure on 
corporate information transparency under the code law system, and (b) the effect of information 
transparency on the initial return rate of convertible bonds. The results of our study revealed that 
the board structure affects corporate information disclosure policies under the code law system. 
Specifically, CEO duality tends to bring about lower information transparency, whereas better 
information transparency emanates from a higher proportion of independent directors. However, 
there is a lack of conclusive evidence to support the view that the shareholdings of directors and 
large shareholders are correlated with information transparency. We also show numerically that 
greater information transparency combined with lesser information asymmetry (between insiders 
and outsiders) leads to a lower initial return rate of convertible bonds. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
irms are required to reveal their true value in capital markets by fully disclosing their operational 
status in the financial statements. Concerns regarding corporate governance and information 
transparency have assumed staggering proportions for market investors. Although maintaining a 
relatively higher level of information transparency invariably leads to increased operational costs, it also enhances 
investors’ valuation of a firm, thereby creating gains in firm value that substantially surpass the accompanying cost 
increases. Therefore, firms that seek financial resources to expand their business must strive to increase transparency 
in the disclosure of internal information. Internal transparency ensures that the firm is aware of its current situation 
and the manner in which it can increase its competitiveness. In contrast, external transparency leads to lower capital 
costs and enables firms to attract long-term investors, both of which not only benefit the firm’s sustainability but 
also enhance investor interest. Cormier et al. (2010) found that firms consider the ultimate costs and benefits to their 
shareholders when determining the extent of disclosure of their governance policies and framework. 
 
Because of the above reasons, there is a growing interest in finding ways to increase information 
transparency. Information transparency depends on a firm’s disclosure behavior and quality, which are influenced by 
the firm’s governance structure. Ho and Wong (2001) investigated the relationship between corporate governance 
policies and voluntary disclosure levels, and found that corporate governance in Hong Kong–based firms is heavily 
influenced by the proportion of independent directors and family members in the composition of their boards. 
Further, their findings indicate that corporate governance policies affect the voluntary disclosure of corporate 
information. Eng and Mak (2003) examined ownership structure and board composition of Singaporean firms and 
their relationship with the voluntary information disclosure behavior of those firms. Their results indicated that 
ownership structure and board composition influence information disclosure. Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) found 
that larger firms adopt stricter disclosure rules than smaller firms, and firms with better disclosure employ 
management that is more competent. 
F 
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Previous studies have also found that the structure and characteristics of corporate governance in a country 
are influenced by its economic, social, political, legal, and historical background. Ball et al. (2000) noted that the 
shareholder’s equity model is adopted for corporate governance in common law countries such as the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Under this model, employees are concerned with maximizing the firm’s interests. In 
contrast, code law countries (e.g., Germany, Japan, and Taiwan) typically employ the stakeholder model for 
corporate governance. Under this model, employees are more concerned with the protection of their employment 
rights including the right to participate in corporate decision-making. The greatest difference between these two 
models is in the treatment of information asymmetry between the internal firm employees and external stakeholders. 
In common law countries, designating independent directors in firms upholds increased information transparency 
and eliminates information asymmetry. However, it remains unclear as to whether the corporate governance system 
that is practiced in common law countries can be implemented in code law countries such as Taiwan to improve 
information transparency. This study endeavored to determine how corporate governance in code law countries, 
which differs from that in common law countries such as the United States, influences corporate information 
disclosure, and examined the relationship between domestic board structure and corporate information transparency. 
 
Previous studies have identified and confirmed the existence of abnormal returns from initial public 
offerings (IPOs). Abnormal returns generally result from underpricing of offerings by the issuing firm. Researchers 
have broadly summarized three explanations to analyze IPO underpricing: information asymmetry (Ritter & Welch, 
2002), information transmission theory (Aggarwal et al., 2002), and investor overreaction (Adams et al., 2008). 
Specifically, with regard to information asymmetry, the greater the degree of information asymmetry between 
investors and issuers or underwriters, the larger the discount offered by the issuing firm to attract investors. Since 
convertible bonds possess the characteristics of both bonds and stocks, this also generates a phenomenon analogous 
to the situation of abnormal returns during initial issuances (Cai et al., 2007). Consequently, this study also aims to 
explore whether the initial return rate variability decreases with information transparency during the initial issuance 
of convertible bonds. 
 
Based on the above assertions, the aims of this study were as follows: (a) To explore the effect of board 
structure composition on corporate information transparency under the code law system. Board structure comprises 
the percentage of director shareholding, CEO duality, percentage of large shareholding, and independent directorship. 
(b) To investigate the effect of information transparency on the initial return rate of convertible bonds. Our results 
show that under the code law system, board structure affects corporate information disclosure policies. Specifically, 
CEO duality tends to lead to lower information transparency, whereas better information transparency emanates 
from a higher proportion of independent directors. However, there is no clear evidence that shareholdings of 
directors and large shareholders are correlated with information transparency. We also show numerically greater 
information transparency and lesser information asymmetry (between insiders and outsiders) leads to a lower initial 
return rate of convertible bonds. 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Information Transparency and Board Structure 
 
According to the interest convergence hypothesis, the percentage of board shareholding is positively 
correlated with corporate performance. When board shareholding exceeds a certain level, board wealth is related to 
corporate performance; therefore, when the board’s interests converge with the firm’s interests, the board exerts its 
supervisory effect to prevent managers from making decisions that may jeopardize the firm’s interests. Lin et al. 
(2013) noted that a higher director shareholding rate enhances firm accounting performance, implying that directors 
with greater shareholding exhibit the intention of greater supervision, thus minimizing agency problems and 
improving operational performance. In addition, Cheung et al. (2011) use time-series data to examine the relation 
between changes in the quality of corporate governance practices and subsequent market valuation among large 
listed companies in Hong Kong. They reported that voluntary disclosures of proprietary information enable the 
capital market to evaluate the securities issued by firms more accurately, and provided evidence to support the 
notion that good corporate governance can predict future market valuation. Thus, to stimulate positive valuations 
from creditors and investors, firms with a satisfactory governance mechanism and operational performance have 
greater incentives to disclose information compared to firms exhibiting poor performance or low corporate 
governance. Based on these arguments, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
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[H1] A high percentage of director shareholding is associated with relatively greater information transparency. 
 
Numerous studies (e.g., Bliss, 2010; Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2010) have reported that the board of 
directors serves as a supervisory mechanism for shareholders to monitor and control the decision-making behavior 
of management. In the event of CEO duality, the CEO-cum-board chairperson simultaneously serves as an executive 
and supervisory unit for decision-making, and thus, is likely to manipulate the board for personal interests, resulting 
in shareholders questioning the impartiality of the board regarding management supervision. Consequently, CEO 
duality often generates concerns related to conflict of interest and the inability to objectively assess management 
performance. Sharma (2004) found that CEO duality may interfere with board resolutions, rendering the objective of 
control and management of decision-making processes difficult, thereby weakening supervisory functions. 
Consequently, the agency costs between shareholders and managers increase, negatively affecting firm performance. 
Geletkanycz and Boyd (2011) also found that CEOs outside directorships are positively related to the long-term 
performance of firms facing competitive constraints on growth. Kang and Kim (2011) note that management could 
influence reported earnings by making accounting choices or operating decisions discretionally, showing that firms 
with CEO duality are more prone to earnings management problem, increasing the likelihood of fraud. Therefore, 
we speculate that for firms with CEO duality, decisions tend to be biased or made according to the CEO’s personal 
interests, which reduces the level of information disclosure and thus, compromises the firm’s information 
transparency. Based on these arguments, we proposed a second hypothesis as follows: 
 
[H2] CEO duality is associated with reduced information transparency. 
 
Compared with retail investors, whose shareholding percentage is relatively low and equities are dispersed, 
major shareholders have a greater incentive to engage in management supervision, and the resources to cover the 
associated costs and expenses. Under certain circumstances, they may even directly participate in business 
management to resolve information asymmetries between internal management and external shareholders. The 
findings reported by Attig et al. (2009) indicate that when firm ownership is concentrated, major shareholders can 
exert effective control on a firm’s operating policies, or recommend appropriate strategies to promote firm value. In 
such cases, major shareholders exploit their dominant voting rights to influence managerial decision-making and 
avoid unfavorable investment plans. Chuang (2007) examined the effect that external major shareholders and 
pre-managed earning shortages exert on earnings management, and found that shareholdings of large external 
shareholders and large external corporate shareholders have a significantly negative effect on discretionary accruals 
and discretionary working capital accruals, and these effects can be leveraged to improve corporate governance. 
Therefore, to maximize shareholder wealth, ownership concentrated among major shareholders may generate 
relatively greater incentives for firm monitoring and prompt the disclosure of more information, thereby improving 
information transparency. Accordingly, we proposed the following hypothesis: 
 
[H3] A large shareholder with high percentage of shares is associated with high information transparency. 
 
Sharma (2004) identified that when the proportion of independent directors in a board increases, incidents 
of fraud in financial statements decline, demonstrating the importance of board structure in corporate governance. 
Linck et al. (2008) also highlighted an emerging trend regarding the number of seats for corporate board of directors, 
that is, an increase and decrease in the number of seats for independent and internal directors, respectively. Since an 
increase in the number of independent director seats ensures that board decisions are made with greater objectivity 
and impartiality, agency conflicts are also minimized. Ferreira et al. (2011) showed a positive relationship between 
the proportion of independent directors and the firms’ accounting quality and earning informativeness. In Taiwan, 
Yeh et al. (2004) confirmed that firms with independent directors receive superior market evaluations than firms 
without independent directors. This is because the appointment of independent directors signals the firm’s 
willingness to receive supervision; thus, information asymmetry is reduced, yielding positive effects for the firm. 
Regarding the information asymmetry hypothesis, we speculate that more the number of independent director seats 
in a board, more is the information disclosed by the firm; thus, the firm’s information transparency is expected to be 
relatively greater. Accordingly, we proposed the following hypothesis: 
 
[H4] A high proportion of independent directors in a board ensure relatively greater information transparency. 
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Convertible Bonds and Information Transparency 
 
The IPO underpricing anomaly shows that new shares appear to be issued with a discount on the true value. 
Ibbotson (1975) was the first to test this kind of anomaly, and he confirmed the phenomenon of IPO underpricing. 
Subsequently, researchers worldwide have verified excess returns on initial issuances in various markets. Agathee et 
al. (2012) highlighted that IPO underpricing is triggered by the uncertainty experienced by investors because of 
information asymmetries between investors and issuing firms. Moreover, uncertainty is positively correlated with 
the magnitude of underpricing; in other words, stocks with higher uncertainty are likely to receive greater discounts. 
Therefore, excess returns occur because of underpriced sales by the issuing firm. Issuances are underpriced to 
compensate for investors’ possible losses arising from information asymmetry. They also showed that the hot IPO 
issues markets exhibit, on an average, a greater degree of underpricing than the cold IPO issues markets. 
 
Convertible bonds possess the characteristics of both stocks and bonds. Cai et al. (2007) examined 
underpricing of initial public offerings in the corporate bond market. They found that underpricing occurs with IPOs 
and is highest among riskier, unknown firms. They offered evidence suggesting that information problems drive 
underpricing, with support for both the bookbuilding view of underpricing and the asymmetric information theory. 
Additionally, they showed that initial issuances of convertible bonds also involve excess returns. Hsieh (2011) 
argued that potential arbitrage opportunities exist in Taiwan’s convertible bonds market because of its inherent 
imperfection and inefficiency. If the occurrence of excess returns is analogous to the asymmetric property of IPO 
information, we hypothesize that firms with relatively greater information transparency exhibit less variations in the 
initial returns of convertible bond. Thus, we proposed the following hypothesis: 
 
[H5] High corporate information transparency indicates low changes in the initial return rate of convertible 
bonds. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Sample 
 
The subjects of this study were listed and over-the-counter (OTC) companies in Taiwan. Data was retrieved 
from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ), Securities and Futures Institute, and the information-disclosure 
evaluation system of Securities and Futures Institute. Since 2003, the information disclosure and evaluation system 
of the Securities and Futures Institute has only included firms with relatively high information transparency. In 2005, 
the Institute evaluated companies on a 5-level Grade (A+, A-, B, C, and C-). The ninth evaluation was performed in 
2011, during which the Institute divided the evaluation result on a 7-level Grade (A++, A+, A, A-, B, C, and C-) to 
enhance the level based on which information disclosure of evaluated firms can be distinguished. To extensively 
investigate the effects that various evaluation levels exert on convertible bonds, this study excluded data from 2003 
to 2004 during which the evaluation level system was not implemented. Therefore, the data included in this study 
are from 2005 to 2012. In addition, the research samples were selected according to the following four criteria: 
 
1. All listed and OTC firms in Taiwan’s securities market, which had issued unsecured domestic convertible 
bonds during the research period. 
2. Sample data must contain complete variables for the research period; incomplete data was eliminated. 
3. Financial and insurance firms are excluded from the research sample because their services differ from 
those offered by other industries. 
4. Firms that are associated with full-cash delivery and managed stocks were excluded from this study 
because they exhibit unique financial structures and employ differing transaction methods. 
 
Based on the aforementioned sample selection criteria, there are 341 final valid samples. 
 
Models 
 
This study first analyzed the relationship between information transparency and the board structure. 
Because credit ratings may affect a firm’s willingness to disclose information, this study also considered firm credit 
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rating. Additionally, different levels of information transparency may exist in various board structures. Therefore, 
based on information disclosure evaluation result of the Securities and Futures Institute, this study divided the 
samples into three categories, namely, Levels A, B, and C, to further analyze the relationship between different 
levels of information transparency and the board structure. Subsequently, empirical testing using logistic regression 
was performed as follows: 
 
Model 1: Analyzing the correlation between corporate information transparency and the board structure 
 
TRANSPAi,t ＝ α0＋α１TCRIi,t＋α2SHAREi,t＋α3CHAIRMi,t＋α4BLOCKi,t＋α5INDi,t＋α6ASSETi,t+εi,t (1) 
 
where TRANSPA is a dummy variable of information transparency, TCRI is credit rating, SHARE is board 
shareholding, CHAIRM is CEO duality, BLOCK is shareholding of large shareholders, IND is the ratio of 
independent directors, and ASSET is firm size. 
 
In addition, considering the three sample groups, this study also examined the effect that various levels of 
information transparency have on the initial return rate for convertible bonds using the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
method. Thus, Model 2 is described as follows: 
 
Model 2: Analyzing the correlation between convertible bonds and corporate information transparency 
 
RETURNi,t ＝ β0＋β１TRANSPAi,t＋β2MARKETi,t＋β3AGEi,t＋β4GROWi,t＋β5SALEi,t＋β6LEVi,t＋εi,t (2) 
 
where RETURN is initial return rate of convertible bonds, TRANSPA is a dummy variable of information 
transparency, MARKET is public offering market, AGE is establishment time, GROW is growth opportunities, SALE 
is firm size, and LEV is financial leverage. 
 
Variable Definitions 
 
Each operational variable included in the empirical model is defined as follows: 
 
Information Transparency (TRANSPA) 
 
In this study, the evaluation results obtained from the information-disclosure evaluation system were used 
as proxy variables to evaluate the transparency of corporate information. Information-disclosure evaluations are 
performed annually. Indicators of the information-disclosure evaluation system can be grouped into the following 
five categories: legal compliance, timeliness of information disclosure, disclosure of predictive financial information, 
disclosure of annual reports, and disclosure of website information. Based on the evaluation results provided by the 
information-disclosure evaluation system established by the Securities and Futures Institute, the research samples 
were divided into three groups, namely, (a) Level A, Grade above A-, (b) Level B, Grade equal B, and (c) Level C, 
Grade under C. 
 
Initial Return Rate of Convertible Bonds (RETURN) 
 
In addition to the prices of underlying stock, the trading prices of convertible bonds are influenced by 
factors such as interest rate fluctuations. To eliminate other confounding factors, the closing price on the first trading 
day was set as the initial return rate. However, given the constraints associated with market regulations (e.g., price 
increase/decrease), if the closing price on the first trading day reaches the upper or lower limit, the closing price of 
the second trading day is selected as the initial return rate. This also applies when the closing price of the second 
trading day reaches its upper or lower limit. 
 
Credit Rating (TCRI) 
 
Credit ratings refer to the evaluation of a firm’s credit status or solvency. The Taiwan Corporate Credit Risk 
Index (TCRI) maintained by the TEJ was used as the proxy variable. TCRI credit ratings can range between Grades 
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1 and 9, where a smaller grade signifies a superior credit rating, and a grade of 10 indicates financial crisis for the 
firm evaluated. 
 
Board Shareholding (SHARE) 
 
Board shareholding is calculated as the number of director shares at the end of the financial year divided by 
the total number of outstanding shares. When the number of shares a director possesses is high and its interests 
converge with the firm’s interests, the director may exert a supervisory effect on the firm to minimize agency 
problems. 
 
CEO Duality (CHAIRM) 
 
CEO duality may reduce the level of management discipline, which jeopardizes the mechanism of 
corporate governance. Thus, CEO duality serves as a dummy variable, where 1 indicates CEO duality and 0 
represents otherwise. 
 
Shareholding of Large Shareholders (BLOCK) 
 
Large shareholders are defined as those holding at least 10% of a firm’s shares (Taiwan Stock Exchange) or, 
according to various annual reports and prospectuses, those who possess the top 10 highest number of shares or 
more than 5% of shares. In this study, the number of shares that a large shareholder possesses is calculated by 
summing the number of shares possessed by large shareholders (according to the Taiwan Stock Exchange); primary 
shareholders, as disclosed in annual reports and prospectuses; and shareholders that are ranked in the top 10. 
Shareholders acting as a director or manager were not included in the calculations. 
 
Ratio of Independent Directors (IND) 
 
Independent directors are defined as those who (a) do not work for the firm, (b) have no consanguinity 
relationship with directors, and (c) possess shares less than 1% when elected as an independent director. Therefore, 
the independent director ratio is calculated as the total number of independent director seats divided by the number 
of director seats. 
 
Firm Size (ASSET and SALE) 
 
In this study, the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets was used as the proxy variable (ASSET) to denote 
firm size. We anticipated that large firms experience greater pressures and must disclose more information, thus 
exhibiting higher information transparency. In addition, the natural logarithm of net sales (SALE) was used as a 
proxy variable for firm size. 
 
Public Offering Market (MARKET) 
 
In public offering markets, a dummy variable of 1 indicates that trading was conducted in the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange and 0 denotes otherwise. Of the 341 samples obtained in this study, 197 were traded in the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange, and 144 were traded in the Gre Tai Securities Market. The greatest difference between the two markets is 
that the Taiwan Stock Exchange is a centralized trading market of a comparatively larger scale with higher liquidity, 
whereas the Gre Tai Securities Market is maintained for OTC trading, size and liquidity of which are substantially 
smaller. Therefore, for a specific bond, different trading markets signify different liquidity. Convertible bonds with 
lower liquidity require a higher rate of return as compensation. Classifying according to different trading markets, 
we hypothesize that the convertible bonds traded in centralized markets have relatively lower excess returns, 
whereas those traded in OTC markets have comparatively higher excess returns. 
Establishment Time (AGE) 
 
The establishment time is counted from the day of firm founding to the day of convertible bond issuance. 
At the initial stage of convertible bond issuance, information asymmetry exists between the issuing firm and the 
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investors. The longer the firm is established, the more the market understands the operational situation. Therefore, to 
investigate whether a correlation exists between the initial return rate of convertible bonds and information 
transparency, this study used the establishment time as a control variable. 
 
Growth Opportunities (GROW) 
 
Firms with higher growth opportunities possess superior profitability prospects and higher stock returns, 
which subsequently affect the trading price of convertible bonds. In this study, the ratio of market equity to book 
equity was used as a proxy variable for growth opportunities. 
 
Financial Leverage (LEV) 
 
Financial leverage was calculated by dividing the total liabilities of a firm at the end of the year with the 
total assets. When deciding whether to purchase a firm’s convertible bonds, investors consider the firm’s capital 
structure in addition to the converted prices of the underlying bonds. If the firm’s debt ratio is high, the investors 
face greater investment risks, which reduce their willingness to invest. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of our sample on the information disclosure and transparency ranking 
results, for which data period is from 2005 to 2012. In our study, 341 companies issued convertible bonds from 2005 
to 2012. In the 341 listed companies of our sample, 1 company is ranked as “Grade A++,” 11 companies are ranked 
as “Grade A+,” 4 companies are ranked as “Grade A,” 64 companies are ranked as “Grade A-,” 199 companies are 
ranked as “Grade B,” 56 companies are ranked as “Grade C,” and 6 companies are ranked as “Grade C-.” Level A 
companies ranked as Grade above A- are 80 in number, or 23.46% of the samples. Level B companies ranked Grade 
B are 199 in number, or 58.36% of the samples. Level C companies ranked as Grade under C are 62, or 18.18% of 
the samples. 
 
Table 1: Information Disclosure and Transparency Ranking Results 
 
Level A Level B Level C 
Total 
A++ A+ A A- B C C- 
2005 * 0 * 5 8 4 0 17 
2006 * 1 * 11 32 4 1 49 
2007 * 0 * 2 28 11 2 43 
2008 * 0 * 3 15 1 1 20 
2009 * 2 * 10 22 5 0 39 
2010 * 3 * 14 26 11 2 56 
2011 1 3 2 10 38 14 0 67 
2012 0 2 2 9 30 6 0 49 
Total 1 11 4 64 199 56 6 341 
Note: In 2005, the Securities and Futures Institute evaluated companies on a 5-level Grade (A+, A-, B, C, and C-). The ninth evaluation was 
performed in 2011, in which the Institute divided the evaluation result on a 7-level Grade (A++, A+, A, A-, B, C, and C-) to enhance the level 
based on which the information disclosure of evaluated firms can be distinguished. 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of our sample and variables, for which data period is from 2005 to 
2012. The mean of initial return rate of convertible bonds (RETURNi,t) is 8.12, and its median is 7.87, showing that 
the convertible bonds of most companies at the initial return rate of convertible bonds are positive. The maximum 
credit rating (TCRIi,t) is 9.00, showing that the companies will issue convertible bonds to raise capital or improve the 
financial structure despite a financial crisis. The mean of shareholding of large shareholders (BLOCKi,t) is 16.41, and 
the mean of ratio of independent directors (INDi,t) is 0.31. In addition, the mean of CEO duality is 0.35, indicating 
that 35% of the company chairmen are also CEOs in our sample. The average establishment time (AGEi,t) is 10.62, 
its medium is 9.00, and its maximum is 39.00, depicting that the younger companies require higher capital, and 
convertible bonds are the main sources of financing for them. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Medium Maximum Minimum Sta. Dev. 
RETURNi,t 8.12 7.87 28.62 -3.00 6.81 
TCRIi,t 5.66 5.00 9.00 1.00 1.30 
SHAREi,t 23.39 18.13 67.33 5.02 11.89 
CHAIRMi,t 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.48 
BLOCKi,t 16.41 16.51 40.22 0.00 8.74 
INDi,t 0.31 0.38 0.67 0.20 0.14 
ASSETi,t 16.43 16.38 24.52 12.11 1.89 
MARKETi,t 0.58 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.49 
AGEi 10.62 9.00 39.00 6.00 6.12 
GROWi 2.51 1.89 7.31 0.58 1.61 
SALEi 17.45 17.87 23.36 12.21 1.88 
LEVi 40.32 44.35 78.14 13.10 14.81 
Note: 1. Number of observations = 341. 2. Variable definitions: RETURN is initial return rate of convertible bonds. TCRI is credit rating. SHARE 
is board shareholding. CHAIRM is CEO duality. BLOCK is shareholding of large shareholders. IND is the ratio of independent directors. ASSET is 
firm size. MARKET is public offering market. AGE is establishment time. GROW is growth opportunities. SALE is firm size. LEV is financial 
leverage. 3. “Sta. Dev.” denotes Standard Deviation. 
 
Corporate Information Transparency and Construction of the Board 
 
Pearson Correlation Analysis of Corporate Information Transparency and Construction of the Board 
 
To find out whether the level of information transparency is related to different Board constructions, based 
on the information disclosure and evaluation system of the Securities and Futures Institute, this thesis dissects the 
samples into three groups: Level A, Level B, and Level C. Tables 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3 present the related Pearson 
analysis of the transparency of information and construction of the Board. The results of information transparency 
disclosure rankings of TRANSPAi,t in Table 3-1 represent its Level A as 1 and Level B as 0; in Table 3-2, Level B is 
represented as 1 and Level C as 0; in Table 3-3, Level A is represented as 1 and Level C as 0. 
 
Table 3-1: Pearson Correlation Analysis of Corporate Information Transparency and Construction of the Board 
(TRANSPA is a dummy variable of information transparency, which takes 1 if Level A, and 0 if Level B) 
  TRANSPAi,t TCRIi,t SHAREi,t CHAIRMi,t BLOCKi,t INDi,t ASSETi,t 
TRANSPAi,t 1.000       
TCRIi,t 
-0.179** 
(0.043) 
1.000      
SHAREi,t 
0.087 
(0.213) 
-0.084 
(0.201) 
1.000     
CHAIRMi,t 
-0.039 
(0.348) 
0.158* 
(0.068) 
-0.091 
(0.192) 
1.000    
BLOCKi,t 
-0.127* 
(0.079) 
0.128 
(0.112) 
-0.017 
(0.429) 
0.067 
(0.254) 
1.000   
INDi,t 
-0.025 
(0.348) 
0.122 
(0.171) 
0.193** 
(0.034) 
-0.241** 
(0.018) 
0.081 
(0.227) 
1.000  
ASSETi,t 
0.233** 
(0.019) 
-0.599*** 
(<0.001) 
0.088 
(0.177) 
0.066 
(0.270) 
-0.388*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.363*** 
(0.001) 
1.000 
Note: 1. Number of observations = 279. 2. *, **, and *** denote significance beyond 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 3. 
Variable definitions: TRANSPA is a dummy variable of information transparency, which takes 1 if Level A, and 0 if Level B. TCRI is credit rating, 
SHARE is board shareholding, CHAIRM is CEO duality, BLOCK is shareholding of large shareholders, IND is the ratio of independent directors, 
and ASSET is firm size. 
 
The significant negative correlation between TRANSPAi,t and TCRIi,t in Table 3-1 and Table 3-3 indicates a 
worse state of information transparency for companies in financial crisis. The significant negative correlation 
between TRANSPAi,t and BLOCKi,t in Table 3-1 is unexpected, and it is insignificant in Table 3-2 and Table 3-3. The 
significant positive correlation between TRANSPAi,t and INDi,t in Table 3-2 is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
higher the number of seats for independent directors, the better the corporate governance and information 
transparency of the company. There is significant positive correlation between ASSETi,t and TRANSPAi,t in Table 3-1 
and Table 3-3, which indicates that the bigger the company, the better is its information transparency. However, 
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SHAREi,t and CHAIRMi,t are not significant in the tables on Pearson related analysis and in the statistics, and as a 
result, only hypothesis 4 is supported in this part. 
 
Table 3-2: Pearson Correlation Analysis of Corporate Information Transparency and Construction of the Board 
(TRANSPA is a dummy variable of information transparency, which takes 1 if Level B, and 0 if Level C) 
 TRANSPAi,t TCRIi,t SHAREi,t CHAIRMi,t BLOCKi,t INDi,t ASSETi,t 
TRANSPAi,t 1.000       
TCRIi,t 
0.004 
(0.482) 
1.000      
SHAREi,t 
-0.055 
(0.306) 
-0.094 
(0.182) 
1.000     
CHAIRMi,t 
-0.093 
(0.194) 
-0.222** 
(0.019) 
-0.106 
(0.124) 
1.000    
BLOCKi,t 
-0.041 
(0.342) 
0.070 
(0.254) 
-0.005 
(0.489) 
0.119 
(0.131) 
1.000   
INDi,t 
0.176* 
(0.052) 
0.022 
(0.431) 
0.209** 
(0.017) 
-0.180** 
(0.044) 
-0.042 
(0.354) 
1.000  
ASSETi,t 
0.021 
(0.429) 
-0.595*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.120 
(0.134) 
-0.149* 
(0.072) 
-0.207** 
(0.024) 
-0.215** 
(0.020) 
1.000 
Note: 1. Number of observations = 261. 2. *, **, and *** denote significance beyond 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 3. 
Variable definitions: TRANSPA is a dummy variable of information transparency, which takes 1 if Level B, and 0 if Level C. TCRI is credit rating, 
SHARE is board shareholding, CHAIRM is CEO duality, BLOCK is shareholding of large shareholders, IND is the ratio of independent directors, 
and ASSET is firm size. 
 
Table 3-3: Pearson Correlation Analysis of Corporate Information Transparency and Construction of the Board 
(TRANSPA is a dummy variable of information transparency, which takes 1 if Level A, and 0 if Level C) 
 TRANSPAi,t TCRIi,t SHAREi,t CHAIRMi,t BLOCKi,t INDi,t ASSETi,t 
TRANSPAi,t 1.000       
TCRIi,t 
-0.245* 
(0.061) 
1.000      
SHAREi,t 
0.059 
(0.317) 
0.094 
(0.281) 
1.000     
CHAIRMi,t 
-0.152 
(0.172) 
0.118 
(0.231) 
-0.092 
(0.280) 
1.000    
BLOCKi,t 
-0.196 
(0.110) 
0.073 
(0.328) 
-0.152 
(0.170) 
-0.097 
(0.269) 
1.000   
INDi,t 
0.177 
(0.131) 
0.159 
(0.162) 
0.011 
(0.468) 
0.157 
(0.175) 
0.001 
(0.500) 
1.000  
ASSETi,t 
0.287** 
(0.034) 
-0.391*** 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.494) 
-0.253* 
(0.055) 
-0.337** 
(0.014) 
-0.491*** 
(0.001) 
1.000 
Note: 1. Number of observations = 142. 2. *, **, and *** denote significance beyond 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 3. 
Variable definitions: TRANSPA is a dummy variable of information transparency, which takes 1 if Level A, and 0 if Level C. TCRI is credit rating, 
SHARE is board shareholding, CHAIRM is CEO duality, BLOCK is shareholding of large shareholders, IND is the ratio of independent directors, 
and ASSET is firm size. 
 
Logistic Regression Result of Corporate Information Transparency and Construction of the Board 
 
Table 4 presents the logistic regression result of corporate information transparency and construction of the 
board. Based on the results of information disclosure rankings, this thesis classifies samples into Level A, Level B, 
and Level C to compare and analyze each group of samples. TRANSPAi,t of the empirical result 1 of Model 1 
represents its Level A as 1 and Level B as 0. TRANSPAi,t of the empirical result 2 of Model 1 represents its Level B 
as 1 and Level C as 0. TRANSPAi,t of the Empirical Result 3 of Model 1 represents its Level A as 1 and Level C as 0. 
 
Table 4 indicates the follows: 
 
1. The significant negative correlation between TCRIi,t and TRANSPAi,t in empirical results 1 and 3 implies 
that the higher the ratings, the lesser the information disclosure and thus, the worse the information 
transparency. In other terms, the company would not disclose much information during financial crisis. 
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2. Although the positive correlation between SHAREi,t and TRANSPAi,t in empirical results 1 and 3 is expected, 
it is not significant. However, in empirical result 2, TCRIi,t and TRANSPAi,t are significant negative 
correlated. This is because the intention of directors of companies with lower ratings and bigger shares to 
manipulate earnings for personal benefits reduces information transparency of such companies when their 
shares are bigger. 
3. The significant negative correlation between CHAIRMi,t and TRANSPAi,t in empirical results 2 and 3 
indicates that CEO duality tends to lead to lower information transparency. As a result, hypothesis 2 is 
supported empirically. 
4. The negative correlation between BLOCKi,t and TRANSPAi,t of the empirical study of Model 1 is not 
significant, implying that there is no clear evidence that shareholdings of directors and large shareholders 
are correlated with information transparency. As a result, hypothesis 3 is not supported. 
5. The significant positive correlation between INDi,t and TRANSPAi,t in empirical results 2 and 3 is expected. 
However, it is insignificant in result 1. This is because the higher the ratings of a company, the better its 
management, and as a result, the function of INDi,t lessens. Moreover, as shown in empirical results 2 and 3, 
companies with lower ratings have more seats for independent directors and better management. Thus, 
hypothesis 4 is supported empirically. 
6. Empirical result 3 is the best in the empirical study of overall model fitness of Model 1, possibly since 
TRANSPAi,t of empirical result 3 is the comparison between the samples of Range A and Range C. The large 
difference enables easy detection of the connection between information transparency and construction of 
the board. 
 
To conclude, information transparency is lower when the CEO also holds the position of the chairperson of 
the board, that is, the higher the number of independent directors, the greater the information transparency. 
Furthermore, information transparency of a company will remain unaffected no matter whether the stocks are held 
by the directors or major holders. 
 
Table 4: Logistic Regression Result of Corporate Information Transparency and Construction of the Board 
Model 1: TRANSPAi,t ＝ α0＋α１TCRIi,t＋α2SHAREi,t＋α3CHAIRMi,t＋α4BLOCKi,t＋α5INDi,t＋α6ASSETi,t+εi,t 
Variables Expected Sign 
Result 1 Result 2 Result 3 
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
TCRIi,t - -0.225
* 0.096 0.031 0.181 -0.343* 0.064 
SHAREi,t + 0.012 0.148 -0.022
* 0.081 0.015 0.139 
CHAIRMi,t - -0.297 0.161 -0.393
* 0.095 -0.579* 0.097 
BLOCKi,t + -0.024 0.126 -0.011 0.148 -0.018 0.132 
INDi,t + 0.121 0.237 2.839
** 0.019 5.525*** 0.007 
SIZEi,t + 0.178 0.127 0.158 0.116 0.647
** 0.020 
Constant  -2.770 0.153 -1.274 0.164 -9.368** 0.044 
Number of Observations 279  261  142  
Cox & Snell R Square 0.228  0.269  0.324  
p-value 0.125  0.088  0.020  
Note: 1. TRANSPA is a dummy variable of information transparency. Result 1 of Model 1 represents its Level A as 1 and Level B as 0. 
Result 2 of Model 1 represents its Level B as 1 and Level C as 0. Result 3 of Model 1 represents its Level A as 1 and Level C as 0. 2. 
Variable definitions: TRANSPA is a dummy variable of information transparency, TCRI is credit rating, SHARE is board shareholding, 
CHAIRM is CEO duality, BLOCK is shareholding of large shareholders, IND is the ratio of independent directors, and ASSET is firm size. 
3. *, **, and *** denote significance beyond 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
The Initial Return Rate of Convertible Bonds and Information Transparency 
 
Pearson Correlation Analysis of Initial Return Rate of Convertible Bonds and Information Transparency 
 
To find out whether different levels of information transparency have a different effect on the initial return 
rate of convertible bonds, based on the information transparency disclosure rankings system of the Securities and 
Futures Institute, this thesis dissects the samples into three groups: Level A, Level B, and Level C. Tables 5-1, 5-2, 
and 5-3 are Pearson related analysis of the initial return rate of convertible bonds and company information 
transparency. The results of information transparency disclosure rankings of TRANSPAi,t in Table 5-1 represents its 
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Level A as 1 and Level B as 0; in Table 5-2, Level B is represented as 1 and Level C as 0; in Table 5-3, Level A is 
represented as 1 and Level C as 0. 
 
As expected, the negative correlation between RETURNi,t and TRANSPAi,t in Table 5-1 is significant, but 
becomes positive in Table 5-2 and thus, hypothesis 5 cannot be supported by empirical study in this part. As for the 
other variables, the significant positive correlation between RETURNi,t and GROWi,t implies that companies with 
better growth opportunities or better managing achievements have higher initial return rate of convertible bonds. 
However, SALEi,t is of significant negative correlation in Table 5-1 and Table 5-2, which indicates that higher the 
information transparency, lower the initial return rate of convertible bonds. 
 
Table 5-1: Pearson Correlation Analysis of Initial Return Rate of Convertible Bonds and Information Transparency 
(TRANSPA is a dummy variable of information transparency, which takes 1 if Level A, and 0 if Level B) 
 RETURNi,t TRANSPAi,t MARKETi,t AGEi,t GROWi,t SALEi,t LEVi,t 
RETURNi,t 1.000       
TRANSPAi,t 
-0.146* 
(0.089) 
1.000      
MARKETi,t 
-0.007 
(0.481) 
0.141* 
(0.098) 
1.000     
AGEi,t 
-0.133 
(0.127) 
0.101 
(0.179) 
0.634*** 
(<0.001) 
1.000    
GROWi,t 
0.222** 
(0.020) 
-0.060 
(0.289) 
-0.083 
(0.221) 
-0.086 
(0.212) 
1.000   
SALEi,t 
-0.277*** 
(0.004) 
0.218** 
(0.021) 
0.450*** 
(<0.001) 
0.477*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.124 
(0.126) 
1.000  
LEVi,t 
-0.248** 
(0.010) 
0.084 
(0.224) 
-0.059 
(0.290) 
-0.020 
(0.429) 
-0.331*** 
(0.001) 
0.339** 
(0.001) 
1.000 
Note: 1. Number of observations = 279. 2. *, **, and *** denote significance beyond 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 3. 
Variable definitions: RETURN is initial return rate of convertible bonds; TRANSPA is a dummy variable of information transparency, which takes 
1 if Level A, and 0 if Level B; MARKET is public offering market; AGE is establishment time; GROW is growth opportunities; SALE is firm size; 
and LEV is financial leverage. 
 
Table 5-2: Pearson Correlation Analysis of Initial Return Rate of Convertible Bonds and Information Transparency 
(TRANSPA is a dummy variable of information transparency, which takes 1 if Level B, and 0 if Level C) 
 RETURNi,t TRANSPAi,t MARKETi,t AGEi,t GROWi,t SALEi,t LEVi,t 
RETURNi,t 1.000       
TRANSPAi,t 
0.212** 
(0.027) 
1.000      
MARKETi,t 
-0.031 
(0.383) 
-0.222** 
(0.015) 
1.000     
AGEi,t 
-0.037 
(0.376) 
-0.283*** 
(0.004) 
0.553*** 
(<0.001) 
1.000    
GROWi,t 
0.181** 
(0.046) 
0.165* 
(0.058) 
-0.134 
(0.131) 
-0.159* 
(0.059) 
1.000   
SALEi,t 
-0.159* 
(0.066) 
0.029 
(0.391) 
0.462*** 
(<0.001) 
0.401*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.107 
(0.160) 
1.000  
LEVi,t 
-0.224** 
(0.017) 
-0.140* 
(0.096) 
0.079 
(0.236) 
-0.031 
(0.385) 
-0.221** 
(0.016) 
0.245** 
(0.010) 
1.000 
Note: 1. Number of observations = 261. 2. *, **, and *** denote significant beyond 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 3. 
Variable definitions: RETURN is initial return rate of convertible bonds; TRANSPA is a dummy variable of information transparency, which takes 
1 if Level B, and 0 if Level C; MARKET is public offering market; AGE is establishment time; GROW is growth opportunities; SALE is firm size; 
and LEV is financial leverage. 
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Table 5-3: Pearson Correlation Analysis of Initial Return Rate of Convertible Bonds and Information Transparency 
(TRANSPA is a dummy variable of information transparency, which takes 1 if Level A, and 0 if Level C) 
 RETURNi,t TRANSPAi,t MARKETi,t AGEi,t GROWi,t SALEi,t LEVi,t 
RETURNi,t 1.000       
TRANSPAi,t 
0.073 
(0.321) 
1.000      
MARKETi,t 
0.152 
(0.172) 
-0.101 
(0.264) 
1.000     
AGEi,t 
0.063 
(0.345) 
-0.158 
(0.161) 
0.459*** 
(0.001) 
1.000    
GROWi,t 
-0.101 
(0.254) 
0.206* 
(0.097) 
0.060 
(0.351) 
-0.191 
(0.115) 
1.000   
SALEi,t 
-0.005 
(0.474) 
0.316** 
(0.020) 
0.471*** 
(0.001) 
0.488*** 
(0.001) 
-0.149 
(0.149) 
1.000  
LEVi,t 
-0.021 
(0.444) 
-0.050 
(0.389) 
0.218* 
(0.090) 
-0.031 
(0.431) 
-0.210* 
(0.092) 
0.466*** 
(<0.001) 
1.000 
Note: 1. Number of observations = 142. 2. *, **, and *** denote significance beyond 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 3. 
Variable definitions: RETURN is initial return rate of convertible bonds; TRANSPA is a dummy variable of information transparency, which takes 
1 if Level A, and 0 if Level C; MARKET is public offering market; AGE is establishment time; GROW is growth opportunities; SALE is firm size; 
and LEV is financial leverage. 
 
Regression of Initial Return Rate of Convertible Bonds and Information Transparency 
 
Table 6 presents the regression result of initial return rate of convertible bonds and information 
transparency. Based on information disclosure rankings result, this thesis dissects all samples into Level A, Level B, 
and Level C to analyze each group of samples. TRANSPAi,t of the empirical result 1 of Model 1 represents its Level 
A as 1 and Level B as 0. TRANSPAi,t of the empirical result 2 of Model 1 represents its Level B as 1 and Level C as 0. 
TRANSPAi,t of the empirical result 3 of Model 1 represents its Level A as 1 and Level C as 0. 
 
Table 6 shows the related results of initial return rate of convertible bonds and information transparency:  
 
1. There is a negative but insignificant correlation between TRANSPAi,t and RETURNi,t in empirical result 1, 
which indicates that the correlation between companies with information rankings A or B and RETURNi,t is 
not very wide. However, there is a significant negative correlation between TRANSPAi,t and RETURNi,t in 
empirical results 2 and 3, implying that for companies of lower rankings, there are fewer chances for stock 
price and revenue manipulation, which decrease the initial return rate of convertible bonds. This result is 
expected and thus, hypothesis 5 is supported empirically. 
2. As for the other control variables, there is a significant positive correlation between MARKETi,t and 
RETURNi,t in empirical results 1 and 3, which indicates that the market will affect the initial return rate of 
convertible bonds. GROWi,t is of significant positive correlation under every empirical result of Model 2, 
which indicates that higher the future growth possibilities, more willing are the investors to hold 
convertible bonds, which increase the initial return rate of convertible bonds. 
3. However, SALEi,t is of significant negative correlation under every empirical result since companies are 
required to disclose their previous month revenue condition before the 10
th
 of every month. The bigger the 
company, the more the attention and supervision it might get from the society and the government and thus, 
it will disclose more information. As a result, the convertible price of convertible bond would have been 
added up before open market operations and will become key when adjusting down the price. 
 
To conclude, information transparency will indeed affect the initial return rate of convertible bonds. Higher 
the information transparency, lower the initial return rate of convertible bonds. 
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Table 6: Regression of Initial Return Rate of Convertible Bonds and Information Transparency 
Model 2: RETURNi,t＝β0＋β１TRANSPAi,t＋β2MARKETi,t＋β3AGEi,t＋β4GROWi,t＋β5SALEi,t＋β6LEVi,t＋εi,t 
Variables Expected Sign 
Result 1 Result 2 Result 3 
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Constant  18.432** 0.034 13.627* 0.069 19.167* 0.059 
TRANSPAi,t - -1.445 0.147 -3.137
** 0.018 -3.317* 0.067 
MARKETi,t + 2.375
* 0.062 1.247 0.151 3.127* 0.054 
AGEi,t - -0.188 0.122 0.057 0.217 0.053 0.291 
GROWi,t + 0.670
* 0.051 0.516* 0.097 1.277* 0.091 
SALEi,t + -0.918
** 0.038 -0.887** 0.043 -1.090* 0.089 
LEVi,t - 0.062 0.118 0.069
* 0.079 -0.004 0.321 
Number of Observations 279  261 
 
142  
Adj
2R  0.096  0.062 0.058  
p-value 0.047  0.038 0.022  
Note: 1. TRANSPA is a dummy variable of information transparency. Result 1 of Model 1 represents its Level A as 1 and Level B 
as 0. Result 2 of Model 1 represents its Level B as 1 and Level C as 0. Result 3 of Model 1 represents its Level A as 1 and Level 
C as 0. 2. Variable definitions: RETURN is initial return rate of convertible bonds; TRANSPA is a dummy variable of information 
transparency, which takes 1 if Level A, and 0 if Level C; MARKET is public offering market; AGE is establishment time; GROW 
is growth opportunities; SALE is firm size; and LEV is financial leverage. 3. *, **, and *** denote significance beyond 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Information transparency is a popular topic in capital markets. Under the system, the construction of the 
board can have a significant effect on the level of information disclosure of the company. Besides, with convertible 
bonds becoming increasingly popular, there is another issue of whether information transparency will affect the 
initial return rate of convertible bonds. The empirical study involved in this thesis results in the following 
conclusions. 
 
Information Transparency is Lower When the CEO Also Holds the Position of the Chairperson of the 
Board 
 
If the CEO also holds the position of the chairperson of the board, he or she might choose a policy that is 
advantageous to him on facing conflicts, thus harming the company. As a result, less information will be disclosed, 
resulting in lower information transparency. 
 
The More the Number of Independent Directors, The Higher the Information Transparency 
 
The higher the number of independent directors in a company, the higher its monitoring functions and better 
its management. Therefore, the company will be more willing to hire more independent directors to decrease 
information asymmetry. Information disclosure is an important method of decreasing information asymmetry. Thus, 
the higher the number of independent directors, the better the information transparency of the company. 
 
The Shareholdings of Directors and Large Shareholders will not affect the Information Transparency 
 
We did not find any positive correlation between information transparency and the shareholdings of 
directors and large shareholders. The higher the shareholdings of directors or large shareholders, the lower the rate 
of shareholdings of minor shareholders and the lower the pressure for the company to disclose its related 
information. As a result, the company will not disclose its related information very often to decrease the cost of 
information disclosure and thus, information transparency will be low. 
 
The Higher the Information Transparency, The Lower the Initial Return Rate of the Convertible Bonds 
 
Issuance of new discount bonds is intended to make up for the possible loss that the risk of information 
asymmetry might bring to the investors. We also found a negative correlation between information transparency and 
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the initial return rate of convertible bonds that have the features of stocks. The higher the information transparency, 
the lower the initial return rate of convertible bonds, and vice versa. 
 
In conclusion, the construction of the board, including the number of seats for the chairperson, managing 
director, and independent director will affect the information disclosure policy and information transparency of a 
company. Besides, the higher the information transparency of a company, the smaller the problem of information 
asymmetry for inside and outside users and thus, the initial return rate of convertible bonds will be lower. This thesis 
uses the evaluation result of information disclosure rankings system as the proxy variable for evaluating corporate 
information transparency. It is intended that the follow-up study would use multiple indexes to evaluate information 
transparency to further refine our research. 
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